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Previous research has found that Medicare benefits flow primarily to the most economically
advantaged groups and that the financial returns to Medicare are consequently higher for the rich
than for the poor. Taking a different approach, we find very different results.  According to the
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, the poorest groups receive the most benefits at any given age.
In fact, the advantage of the poor in benefit receipt is so great that it easily overcomes their higher
death rates. This leads to the result that the financial returns to Medicare are actually much higher
for poorer groups in the population and that Medicare is a highly progressive public program. These
new results appear to owe themselves to our measurement of socioeconomic status at the individual
level, in contrast to the aggregated measures used by previous research.
Jay Bhattacharya
Stanford University








Santa Monica, CA 90407
and NBER
darius@rand.org1 Introduction
Medicare is one of the most signi¯cant public entitlement programs in the United States, and
certainly the most important program in health. In 1998, Medicare bene¯t payments alone
accounted for 13% of the Federal budget and 2.5% of GDP (US Department of Health and
Human Services, 1999). The sheer size of Medicare makes it important for us to understand
and quantify its value. In particular, we need to know about the distribution of Medicare
bene¯ts and costs, whether Medicare actually bene¯ts anyone, and if so whom.
Though Medicare's primary ¯nancing mechanism involves substantial intergenerational
transfers of income,1 whether Medicare has actually bene¯ted particular groups in a cohort
depends also on how it redistributes money within generations. Medicare may have improved
the lot of the average person in today's elderly cohorts, but not necessarily the lot of the
average poor person or the average rich person. It is clear that Medicare taxation transfers
resources from the rich to the poor. However, a great deal of previous research has argued
that Medicare's bene¯t structure undoes this by transferring resources back to the rich (Long
and Settle, 1984; Gornick et al., 1996; McClellan and Skinner, 1997). This research ¯nds
that the poor use fewer Medicare resources at any given age, and that their earlier mortality
further deprives them of Medicare bene¯ts.2
In this paper, we present some new evidence on socioeconomic status and Medicare
bene¯ts, and we reach very di®erent conclusions. We ¯nd that Medicare spends far more
1The two primary mechanisms by which Medicare e®ects intergenerational transfers are variations in
cohort size and growth in medical care expenditures over time. Since the introduction of Medicare, expen-
ditures per bene¯ciary have grown nearly 4% per annum, as documented in footnote 10.
2This research mirrors analogous literature on the progressivity of Social Security. The early literature
on this topic (Burkhauser and Warlick, 1981; Hurd and Shoven, 1985; Boskin and Pu®ert, 1988; Duggan
et al., 1993) ignores the lower mortality rates faced by members of disadvantaged groups. Shoven et al.
(1987) ¯nd that the progressivity of Social Security is considerably °attened when the di®erential mortality
of smokers is taken into account. Similarly, Garrett (1995) ¯nds that di®erences in mortality between the
poor and rich eliminates the \progressive spread in returns" to Social Security across income categories.
1on the poor than on the rich at any given age. Reversing the direction of the relationship
between socioeconomic status and Medicare bene¯ts has a huge impact on the evaluation of
Medicare as a welfare program. In particular, we calculate that the net actuarial value of
the Part A bene¯ts received by the 1931-41 birth cohort was much higher for the poor than
for the rich. While Medicare is actuarially unfair for college graduates, high school dropouts
almost double their money. This is in contrast to previous research, which has found that the
actuarial value of Medicare is much higher for the rich, or that Medicare results in a lifetime
¯nancial transfer from poor to rich. Even after accounting for the extra access to insurance
that Medicare provides the poor, this research has found it at best equally bene¯cial for rich
and poor groups (McClellan and Skinner, 1997).
Unlike much of the previous literature, we use an individual's own educational attainment
as a measure of socioeconomic status. In contrast, other researchers have used average income
in an individual's area of residence. We ¯nd evidence that aggregation bias may be the reason
for the discrepancy between the two methods. In a single data set where less educated
individuals consume far more Medicare bene¯ts than the more educated, individuals who
live in richer areas still appear to receive more bene¯ts than those who live in poorer areas.
This could be because people with high demands for medical care have incentives to move
to richer areas, where medical care may be of higher quality. As a result, more bene¯ts may
be paid in richer areas, even if richer individuals themselves are not receiving more.
2 A Framework for Analyzing Progressivity
To analyze the welfare e®ects of Medicare for di®erent socioeconomic groups, we ¯rst have to
identify what we mean by socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged. We argue that
2an individual's own educational attainment is a useful way to identify the disadvantaged.
We then present a simple framework for estimating the ¯nancial returns to Medicare for each
group.
2.1 Measuring Socioeconomic Status
Conceptually, socioeconomic status ought to be measured using permanent income, which is
the closest thing economists have to a de¯nition of socioeconomic status. Ideally, we would
like to study how Medicare bene¯ts vary across permanent income levels. Unfortunately
though, permanent income is unobserved, and only its correlates are available for analysis.
One often-used correlate is the average income in an individual's zip code or area of
residence. This avoids many of the problems associated with measurement using current-
period income by smoothing out life-cycle and idiosyncratic °uctuations in income, but it
introduces the possibility of aggregation bias (Geronimus et al., 1996). There are at least
two issues to consider. First, richer areas may have higher quality medical facilities.3 People
with high demands for medical care thus have incentives to move to such areas, holding their
permanent income constant. Even if individual wealth has no e®ect on health expenditures,
health expenditures could be higher in wealthier areas. Second, richer areas will tend to be
older, for life-cycle income reasons, even though this may not re°ect di®erences in permanent
income. Since older people have higher demands for medical care, this too can create a
positive relationship between health expenditures and area wealth. Several previous studies
have found a positive relationship between Medicare expenditures and area income (cf. Long
and Settle, 1984; McClellan and Skinner, 1997). Is this an artifact of aggregation bias, or do
3For example, Chandra and Skinner (2002) show that areas with a higher percentage of white residents
are likely to have higher quality medical facilities.
3wealthier people actually cost Medicare more?
One way to assess this is to measure SES at the individual level. Unfortunately, an
individual's current-period income is a rather poor measure of permanent income, because
it is subject to idiosyncratic and life-cycle °uctuation. A more theoretically sound measure
is an individual's educational attainment. An individual's permanent income is generated
by the returns to human and nonhuman wealth. Human wealth consists of schooling and
unobserved ability. A great deal of research in labor economics suggests that schooling is a
very good measure of human wealth, and that unobserved ability is not a very signi¯cant
component (cf, Card, 1995). In addition, the vast majority of aggregate wealth in the
economy is human wealth (Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1995). Brown and Weisbenner (2002)
¯nd that life-cycle (labor) income is three times more important than bequests and inter vivos
transfers, which account for 20 to 25% of aggregate wealth. Moreover, even this amount is
concentrated among a relatively small percentage of households. Since schooling is perhaps
the best feasible measure of human wealth, and since human wealth makes up the majority
of total lifetime wealth, schooling is a reasonable way to measure permanent income and
SES at the individual level.
2.2 Measuring the Returns to Medicare
De¯ne Bit as the Medicare bene¯ts received by the average individual in group i at age t and
de¯ne ¿it as the Medicare taxes paid by i at t. Finally, de¯ne Sit as the probability that i
survives to age t. If the real rate of interest is r, the expected net present value of Medicare





(1 + r)t¡18 (2.1)
This expression is not exactly identical to the welfare bene¯ts of Medicare to i, but it is
related. McClellan and Skinner (1997) ¯nd that considering only the pure dollar transfers of
Medicare understates the relative bene¯t to the poor, who disproportionately bene¯ted from
the increased access to insurance provided by Medicare. Therefore, if the absolute dollar
transfers favor the poor, it is likely that they disproportionately bene¯t in terms of welfare
also.
Rewriting equation (2.1) provides us with another useful analytic tool, the internal rate





(1 + ½)t¡18 = 0 (2.2)
The internal rate of return on Medicare is the real rate of interest that would have to
obtain in order to set the net present dollar value of Medicare to zero. Conceptually, the
internal rate of return would tell us everything we need to know about welfare if a complete
private market for old-age medical insurance existed without Medicare. In other words, if
people could buy policies when young and receive bene¯ts when old, the private market
would price these policies such that their internal rate of return equaled the real rate of
interest: this would be the zero pro¯t condition. Therefore, abstracting from the market
incompleteness that might generate an insurance value of Medicare, individual i derives a
welfare bene¯t from Medicare if his internal rate of return on it exceeds the real rate of
interest, commonly estimated at around 3% per annum (Siegel, 1992). Since Medicare most
likely did help to complete the market for old-age medical insurance (McClellan and Skinner,
51997), the simple calculation probably understates the relative welfare bene¯ts of Medicare
for the poor.
Estimating the net present value and the internal rate of return of Medicare for di®erent
education groups requires that we calculate a survival pro¯le Sit, a bene¯ts pro¯le Bit, and
a tax pro¯le ¿it for di®erent socioeconomic groups i. The next few sections document our
estimates for these three quantities. We will con¯ne our analysis to the hospital insurance
component, or Part A, of Medicare, since it is easy to identify the payroll taxes that fund
this program. However, we estimate the educational gradient in total Medicare bene¯ts and
¯nd that it is quite similar.
3 Mortality and Socioeconomic Status
Standard life tables tend not to report survival probabilities by education group. Therefore,
to calculate Sit for di®erent education groups i, we start with standard Social Security
Administration life-tables and adjust them to re°ect mortality di®erences across education
groups. Using microdata from the National Mortality Followback Surveys of 1986 and 1993,
we calculate the ratio of the group-speci¯c death rate to the total death rate. Applying this
ratio to the overall life-table then allows us to compute group-speci¯c survival probabilities.
We construct a 1990 period life table for each sex and education group.4 The 1990 US
Vital Statistics period life table gives us a series ¹ St, the average probability of survival to
age t. Using data from the 1993 National Mortality Followback Survey (NMFS), we then
estimate
Sit
¹ St for several age groups. The NMFS contains individual-level data on a sample
4Since we are calculating the rate of return for a speci¯c birth cohort, the best thing to do would be to
construct a cohort life table, but we know of no source for cohort-speci¯c death rates by education group.
Since mortality rates declined more rapidly among the rich from 1960 onwards (Feldman et al., 1989), it is
likely that this strategy will understate the progressivity of Medicare.
6of decedents from 1992. It is designed to be nationally representative, while oversampling
young decedents. Based on interviews with next-of-kin, the NMFS collects demographic
information about each decedent, including age, sex, race, education, smoking status, and
cause of death. Using the weights provided in the NMFS, we are able to estimate the
total number of deaths nationwide within each age group, and within each age-education
category. To translate the total number of deaths into death rates, we use the National
Health Interview Survey to estimate the 1992 population nationwide in each age-education
category. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 1. With only a few exceptions,
death rates decline uniformly with education group, within an age category. Among very
old women, we observe a slight increase in mortality rates between high school dropouts and
high school graduates. Among 45-54 year-old men and 55-64 year-old women, we observe
mortality rates that are higher for college attendees than high school graduates. Apart from
these isolated cases, mortality rates fall with education.
The associated survival curves are graphed in Figures 1 and 2, for men and women. For
both men and women, 18 year-old high school dropouts are less likely to reach age 65 than
college graduates (or those who will end up as college graduates). However, the di®erence
is twice as large for men as for women. High School dropout males are twenty percentage
points less likely to survive to age 65, while females are only about ten percentage points less
likely. This is one of the reasons why, from an individual perspective, Medicare is a much
better deal for low-skill women than for low-skill men.












































































































18-24 2.36 1.98 0.88 0.46 1.60
25-34 3.83 2.03 1.40 0.67 1.82
35-44 5.00 3.28 2.61 1.23 2.73
45-54 9.45 5.50 6.03 2.80 5.62
55-64 17.47 13.70 12.46 7.43 13.38
65-74 35.23 33.69 26.13 16.94 30.33
75+ 100.94 95.32 78.02 69.99 92.97
18-24 0.63 0.54 0.36 0.21 0.47
25-34 1.40 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.65
35-44 1.98 1.48 0.89 0.88 1.27
45-54 4.69 3.30 2.17 1.50 3.00
55-64 10.33 7.58 7.80 5.45 8.13
65-74 18.65 19.66 15.43 11.82 17.82



































































































































































































































































































































































































































94 The Incidence of Medicare Bene¯ts
We calculate age-speci¯c Medicare bene¯ts, Bit using the Medicare Current Bene¯ciary
Survey (MCBS). This is a nationally representative, longitudinal, random sample of Medicare
bene¯ciaries, and it includes extensive information about Medicare expenditures, along with
demographic information, such as about years of schooling and geographic information.
4.1 Age-speci¯c Medicare Expenditures
The MCBS Cost and Use Files are nationally representative data sets designed to ascertain
utilization and expenditures for the Medicare population. They are available every year
from 1992 to 1998. The sample frame consists of aged and disabled bene¯ciaries enrolled
in Medicare Part A and/or Part B although we use only the aged. The disabled (under
65 years of age) and the oldest-old (85 years of age or over) are oversampled. The MCBS
contains demographic data such as age, sex, race, and educational attainment, along with
state, county, and zip code of residence. It also contains detailed self-reported information
on health, including the prevalence of various conditions, measures of physical limitation in
performing daily activities (ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), and
height and weight.
Table 2 presents average real per capita Medicare bene¯ts by age group, sex, and ed-
ucational attainment.5 As described in Appendix A, these data are all de°ated using the
Geographic Practice Cost Indices (GPCI) and the hospital wage-price indices, to account
for regional di®erences in the price of medical care. The top panel of the table shows the
educational gradient in total Medicare bene¯ts, which equals Medicare Parts A and B fee-for-
5Appendix A describes how expenditure data are collected in the MCBS, and how we identify Part A
and B expenditures.

























































Dropouts Grads Attendees Grads Dropouts Grads Attendees Grads
65-74 $4,455 $3,363 $3,232 $2,366 $4,941 $3,908 $3,794 $3,407
75-84 $6,001 $5,310 $5,433 $4,478 $6,361 $6,051 $6,315 $5,573
85+ $7,565 $6,765 $5,717 $5,915 $7,323 $7,565 $7,561 $6,170
65-74 $2,574 $1,733 $1,612 $892 $2,990 $2,101 $1,891 $1,737
75-84 $3,786 $3,112 $3,171 $2,450 $3,783 $3,590 $3,461 $2,974
85+ $5,290 $4,547 $3,609 $3,974 $4,937 $5,184 $5,208 $3,590
65-74 $1,535 $1,173 $1,092 $1,035 $1,494 $1,309 $1,217 $1,199
75-84 $1,814 $1,630 $1,629 $1,515 $1,930 $1,795 $2,096 $2,005
85+ $1,868 $1,711 $1,576 $1,587 $1,776 $1,770 $1,728 $1,890
65-74 $346 $459 $529 $440 $464 $507 $696 $479
75-84 $405 $568 $635 $513 $648 $666 $757 $595








































































































































































































































































































































11service expenses, plus payments made by Medicare on behalf of its bene¯ciaries to Medicare
HMO's.6
In these data, there are consistent negative gradients in education (that is, low SES
individuals spent more per capita than high SES individuals). The di®erence between high
school dropouts and college graduates is always at least ten percent (for 75-84 year-old
women) and reaches as high as forty-¯ve percent for 65-74 year old men. In addition, there
are few instances of increases in per capita bene¯ts across education levels. Per capita
bene¯ts rise with education only four out of eighteen times, and two of these times involve
di®erences of $120 or less, or about three percent. Most of the negative gradient is driven
by variation in Part A, or hospital insurance bene¯ts. There is also a consistent negative
gradient in Part B bene¯ts, but not as large in magnitude. If anything, there is a positive
gradient in Medicare HMO payments, although these make up a rather small share of total
Medicare bene¯ts.
Part, though not all, of the negative gradient in Medicare bene¯ts is explained by dif-
ferences in health status. Including self-reported occurrence of diseases and disability in
the MCBS erases more than half of the gradient between high school dropouts and college
graduates. The rest could be generated by variation in unobserved health, but it could also
be related to di®erences in private insurance coverage and other factors. (Not surprisingly,
there is a positive gradient in privately ¯nanced medical expenditures, once one controls
for health.) A de¯nitive explanation for the relationship between education and Medicare
bene¯ts, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
6We do not include medical expenditures paid by the HMO's themselves, because this would be double-
counting. The actual payment made by Medicare to the HMO represents the public liability. Any di®erence
between these payments and HMO expenditures represent pro¯t or loss for the private ¯rms, not public
liability for old-age medical care.



















































Dropouts Grads Attendees Grads Dropouts Grads Attendees Grads
$4,817 $3,742 $3,597 $3,141 $4,770 $4,152 $4,010 $4,020
$5,047 $3,874 $3,775 $3,297 $5,733 $4,177 $4,294 $4,211
$5,476 $4,181 $4,011 $3,494 $5,882 $4,544 $3,918 $4,085
$6,301 $4,729 $4,833 $3,325 $5,170 $4,875 $4,688 $3,520
$5,947 $4,383 $4,537 $3,728 $6,609 $4,570 $5,067 $3,912
$6,128 $4,353 $4,591 $3,704 $5,743 $5,427 $6,261 $4,623
$5,432 $4,740 $3,924 $3,677 $6,202 $5,176 $4,732 $4,430
65-74 $3,953 $2,930 $2,865 $1,721 $4,092 $3,633 $3,517 $3,676
75-84 $5,080 $4,643 $5,046 $4,809 $5,438 $5,216 $4,459 $4,847
85+ $6,648 $6,609 $3,778 $6,087 $6,269 $5,327 $7,937 $4,605
65-74 $4,415 $2,985 $2,780 $2,283 $5,147 $3,241 $2,621 $3,452
75-84 $5,234 $4,898 $5,310 $4,663 $6,365 $6,094 $7,733 $6,115





















































































































































































Table 3 demonstrates that high school dropouts enjoyed larger increases in bene¯ts than
college graduates during the early 1990s, a result that is consistent with the ¯ndings of Lee
et al. (1999). However, the middle and bottom panels also show that consistent negative
gradients in bene¯ts existed as early as 1992 and widened even further over time. This
contrasts sharply with studies that examine gradients in Medicare expenditures by zip code
income. These studies, such as Lee et al. (1999), ¯nd substantially positive gradients in
1990, and did not turn consistently negative even by 1995.7
4.2 Lifetime Medicare Bene¯ts
Medicare hospital insurance (Part A) is funded entirely by Medicare payroll taxes. On the
other hand, Part B is funded by general federal revenue and bene¯ciary premia. Therefore,
the ¯nancial return on lifetime payroll taxes is equal to expected lifetime Medicare Part
7Lee, McClellan and Skinner, for instance, ¯nd °at or slightly positive gradients for men aged 65-74 and
75-84.
13A bene¯ts. HMO bene¯ciaries present a complication, because Medicare pays a °at fee to
private HMO's, who in turn provide hospital insurance as well as insurance for items that
would normally be covered by Part B. To decompose HMO payments, we assume that HMO
patients within an age, sex, and education category spend the same proportion of resources
on Part A services as fee-for-service patients in the same category.8 This is taken to be the
proportion of the HMO premium allocated to Part A.
Applying the survival pro¯les estimated earlier to the Part A bene¯ts pro¯le in the MCBS
yields an estimate of expected lifetime Part A bene¯ts.9 This provides us with a cross-section
of Medicare bene¯ts, but we are interested in calculating the lifetime bene¯ts of the 1931-41
birth cohort. This is an important distinction, since real Medicare bene¯ts tend to grow.
Therefore, we calculate the expected value of Medicare bene¯ts under various assumptions
about future real growth in Medicare bene¯ts.
To obtain a more accurate lifetime bene¯t pro¯le, we calculate bene¯ts for smaller age
intervals: 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, and 85+. Within each interval, real bene¯ts are assumed
to be equal at a given point in time. For the sake of comparison, we recalculate the expected
net present value of Medicare bene¯ts assuming di®erent annual real rates of bene¯t growth.
For example, if we assume that bene¯ts grow at X%, we take the cross-sectional bene¯t
¯gures and adjust them according to Bit ¤ (1 + X
100)t¡65. In other words, the bene¯ts for 70
year-olds are assumed to have been growing for 5 years, and so on. The logic behind this
framework is that the 1931-41 birth cohort is entering Medicare eligibility during the MCBS
period. Therefore, it is roughly accurate to regard the MCBS as recording average bene¯ts
8Roughly two-thirds of Medicare expenditures go to Part A services.
9We do not de°ate the bene¯t data using the GPCI or wage-price indices for the purposes of this
calculation, because we are concerned with actual dollars received, in comparison to actual dollars paid. In
practice, however, de°ating the bene¯t data further strengthens Medicare's estimated progressivity.
14Table 4: Expected Net Present Value of Medicare Bene¯ts, by Sex and Education.
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￿ Grad Attendee Grad
0% $45,215 $46,988 $49,105 $50,067 $41,463 $42,277 $43,008 $40,848
1% $25,563 $26,128 $27,306 $27,614 $22,970 $23,186 $23,596 $22,014
2% $14,606 $14,688 $15,355 $15,403 $12,876 $12,866 $13,094 $12,005
3% $8,430 $8,344 $8,727 $8,687 $7,301 $7,221 $7,346 $6,622
4% $4,913 $4,788 $5,012 $4,951 $4,185 $4,098 $4,166 $3,694
5% $2,890 $2,775 $2,907 $2,850 $2,425 $2,351 $2,386 $2,084
0% $71,399 $79,210 $83,026 $87,438 $71,556 $75,719 $76,671 $78,149
1% $39,508 $43,117 $45,136 $47,150 $38,670 $40,558 $41,132 $41,188
2% $22,113 $23,740 $24,829 $25,726 $21,157 $21,987 $22,327 $21,965
3% $12,513 $13,216 $13,815 $14,199 $11,715 $12,060 $12,260 $11,849
4% $7,157 $7,437 $7,772 $7,925 $6,563 $6,692 $6,807 $6,466



























that will be received at the time of entry into Medicare, and to in°ate bene¯ts accordingly.
We explore the impact of real bene¯t growth that ranges from zero to four percent annually,
since the latter ¯gure has been the bene¯t growth rate that Medicare has experienced since
its introduction.10
Table 4 documents the results of the lifetime bene¯t calculation, for various real inter-
est rates and real bene¯t growth rates. Adjusting for survival, and accounting for bene¯t
growth favors the more educated groups, because of their greater longevity. However, even
after accounting for longevity di®erences, male high school dropouts are only at a slight
disadvantage, receiving 12% fewer lifetime bene¯ts than college graduates at a 3% real rate
of interest and 4% real rate of bene¯t growth. Female high school dropouts are just about
level with the other groups. In contrast, high school dropouts earn about half as much as
college graduates, so (as we will con¯rm) the gradient in lifetime taxes paid will be substan-
tially steeper. As we will see below, Table 4 turns out to be the reason why our conclusion
10Data from the Health Care Financing Administration (http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/hstats98/blustat4.htm,
downloaded on March 8, 2002) on total Medicare outlays and total Medicare enrollees, shows that per
capita bene¯ts grew four percent annually from 1966-2000.
15that Medicare transfers resources to the poor is robust to a variety of di®erent estimation
assumptions. No matter how one assembles the data, there is too little variation across
education groups in lifetime Medicare bene¯ts to support any other conclusion.
5 The Lifetime Incidence of Medicare Taxation
To estimate ¿it, expected Medicare taxes paid by group i at time t, we use data on actual
Medicare tax rates, and earnings data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to
construct the expected lifetime tax liability of the 1931-1941 birth cohort.11 The HRS is
a nationally-representative longitudinal household dataset with detailed demographic and
¯nancial data on respondents. We use a restricted version of the HRS that links respondent
information to the actual Social Security earnings records so that we can measure payroll
taxes paid with minimal error. In particular, for 9537 of the 13,478 people present in Wave 1
of the HRS, we have the quarterly earnings subjected to Social Security taxation from 1951
to 1991. Over this period of time, the earnings subjected to Medicare taxation was identical.
From 1991 to 1999, we have detailed data on wage and self-employment earnings from the
HRS itself.12
There are two important problems to solve in these data. First, even though the males
in this cohort have much higher labor force attachment and much higher payroll tax outlays,
it would be misleading to allocate all of this to men. If market and home work are shared
within a family, so too are market wages and market taxes. Therefore, taxes should be
calculated for married couples rather than individual workers. The HRS eases this task
11Since we are evaluating the Part A hospital insurance component of Medicare, we restrict ourselves to
Medicare payroll taxes, which are the sole source of funds for Part A coverage.
12Details on the construction of earnings and taxes are presented in Appendix B.
16Table 5: Expected Net Present Value of Tax Liability faced by Families of HRS Cohort
Members.
Real























￿ Grad Attendee Grad
0% $20,298 $28,676 $32,385 $45,565 $15,406 $24,007 $29,059 $35,777
1% $14,971 $20,983 $23,485 $32,393 $11,458 $17,743 $21,235 $25,659
2% $11,165 $15,534 $17,233 $23,298 $8,612 $13,256 $15,695 $18,621
3% $8,417 $11,633 $12,793 $16,953 $6,540 $10,009 $11,731 $13,672
4% $6,413 $8,810 $9,607 $12,481 $5,016 $7,635 $8,864 $10,155


















































































































































considerably, because it contains earnings histories for many married couples, but we are left
with the task of estimating the family's tax burden for some families that dissolved due to
divorce and death. Second, the HRS does not separate taxable wage income from taxable
self-employment income, even though the two income sources were taxed at di®erent rates
for much of Medicare's history. We thus need some way of estimating the share of income
from self-employment earnings. Both these issues force us to impute portions of data for a
relatively small piece of the HRS sample. In appendix B, we discuss in detail the imputation
procedures used to address these two problems.
Based on historical tax rates, we can estimate taxes paid using earnings data from the
HRS. All these calculations result in an age-pro¯le of real Medicare income (i.e., income
subject to Medicare taxes) for couples, as well as age-pro¯les of real Medicare taxes paid, by
education group. Using our estimated survival curves, we can thus calculated the expected
net present value of a family's Medicare tax liabilities across education groups and sex. When
we report the tax liabilities of a man (or a woman), we are reporting the liability faced by
the family of the average man (or woman) in that category. On average, the families of
college graduates can expect to pay about twice as much in Medicare payroll taxes as the
17families of high school dropouts. This result was quite insensitive to various manipulations
of our assumptions about self-employment income or the imputation of spousal income.
Notice also that the families of women are expected to have fewer liabilities than the
families of men. This result is due almost entirely to the timing of Medicare for the HRS
cohort. Since women tend to have older spouses, their families' income pro¯les peak earlier.
Therefore, they earned a larger portion of their lifetime income before the introduction of
Medicare taxes in 1966. When we calculated what expected tax liabilities would have been
if Medicare had been introduced in 1950, most of this gap disappeared.
6 The Returns to Medicare
To arrive at ¯nal dollar returns from Medicare, we have to reconcile the tax liabilities of
families, in Table 5 with the expected medical bene¯ts of individuals, in Table 4. Our
strategy is to convert the data on individual medical bene¯ts to family bene¯ts by matching
men and women. We assume that families are formed at marriage and dissolved only at the
death of one spouse. To compute the average family Medicare bene¯t for, say, X year-old
college-educated males, we use the proportion of this population that has a living spouse or
ex-spouse, along with the distribution of spousal education for 65 year-old college-educated
males in the HRS. The average Medicare family bene¯t is then equal to the individual's
bene¯t plus the average spousal bene¯t. The latter term is taken to be the probability of
having a living spouse within the age-sex-education cell, multiplied by the weighted average
of Medicare bene¯ts for X year-old females, where the weights are given by the distribution
of spousal education observed for 65 year-old college-educated males in the HRS.
After converting Table 4 to a family basis, we can compute the expected dollar value
18Table 6: Expected Net Present Dollar Flows from Medicare for Families of HRS Cohort
Members, by sex and education of the cohort member.
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￿ Grad Attendee Grad
0% $38,340 $34,245 $32,891 $18,024 $59,260 $54,643 $52,499 $47,178
1% $18,656 $14,853 $13,690 $3,421 $31,403 $26,884 $25,031 $21,049
2% $8,317 $5,087 $4,149 -$2,918 $16,239 $12,322 $10,817 $7,946
3% $2,982 $351 -$377 -$5,239 $8,009 $4,795 $3,612 $1,590
4% $320 -$1,777 -$2,329 -$5,681 $3,582 $1,015 $99 -$1,303
5% -$923 -$2,579 -$2,992 -$5,311 $1,243 -$781 -$1,484 -$2,446
0% $75,587 $77,126 $77,101 $66,803 $105,514 $109,448 $109,991 $110,320
1% $38,868 $38,052 $37,680 $29,635 $56,577 $56,543 $56,112 $55,035
2% $19,389 $17,752 $17,287 $11,297 $30,069 $28,518 $27,773 $26,404
3% $9,103 $7,330 $6,883 $2,539 $15,677 $13,719 $12,946 $11,703
4% $3,736 $2,102 $1,719 -$1,388 $7,872 $5,976 $5,284 $4,287









































































































































































Table 7: Internal rates of return on Medicare by sex, education group, and rates of growth
in Medicare bene¯ts.
Ben. HS HS Coll Coll HS HS Coll Coll
Gwth. Dropout Grad Attendee Grad Overall Dropout Grad Attendee Grad Overall
0% 4.8% 3.6% 3.4% 2.3% 3.7% 4.8% 3.4% 3.0% 2.2% 3.6%
1% 5.1% 4.0% 3.8% 2.8% 4.1% 5.1% 3.8% 3.4% 2.6% 4.0%
2% 5.4% 4.4% 4.2% 3.3% 4.4% 5.4% 4.1% 3.7% 3.1% 4.4%
3% 5.8% 4.8% 4.6% 3.7% 4.8% 5.7% 4.5% 4.1% 3.5% 4.7%
4% 6.1% 5.2% 5.0% 4.2% 5.2% 6.1% 4.9% 4.5% 4.0% 5.1%
5% 6.4% 5.5% 5.4% 4.6% 5.6% 6.4% 5.3% 4.9% 4.4% 5.5%
Males Females
(bene¯ts minus costs) from Medicare for the families of people of a speci¯c sex and educa-
tional attainment. The net °ows of Medicare resources are depicted in Table 6. Given a real
rate of interest at 2% or higher, the net dollar °ows are much higher to the least educated
groups. Therefore, it will certainly be true that the dollar °ows are progressive, in the sense
that they replace a greater percentage of income for the poorest groups.
We can do a quick \reality check" on these numbers by calculating the associated internal
rates of return for each group and comparing them to those predicted by a simple generational
accounting framework. Table 7 displays the internal rates of return. At historical rates of
19Medicare bene¯t growth, around 4%, the overall rate of return is between 5.1% and 5.2%.
We can compare this to a simple calculation of the rate of return from an overlapping
generations model. Suppose cohorts live for two periods: during the ¯rst period, they work
and pay Medicare taxes, and during the second they receive Medicare bene¯ts. De¯ne nt as
the size of the cohort that is working at time t, de¯ne Bt as the Medicare bene¯ts paid at
time t and ¿t as the taxes paid at time t. Assuming that Medicare is a strictly pay-as-you-go
system, we would have the balanced budget constraint:
nt¿t = Btnt¡1 (6.1)
The rate of return earned on Medicare by the time t cohort is:
1 + rt¡1 =
Bt
¿t¡1
= (1 + ¯t¡1)(1 + ¼t¡1); (6.2)
where ¯t¡1 represents the rate of growth in bene¯ts from time t ¡ 1 to time t, and ¼t¡1
represents the rate of growth in population over the same period. Taking logarithms yields
the approximation:
rt¡1 ¼ ¯t¡1 + ¼t¡1 (6.3)
Thus, the return on Medicare is approximately equal to growth in per capita bene¯ts plus
population growth. From 1966 to 2000, the rate of growth in the 18-65 year-old population
was approximately 1.4% annually, while the rate of growth in real per capita Medicare
bene¯ts was about 4 percent annually. This roughly corresponds to a 5.4 percent annual
return on Medicare. This back of the envelope calculation is in the same ballpark as our
20estimated internal rates of return.
7 Aggregation Bias
Unlike McClellan and Skinner (1997), we ¯nd that the ¯nancial returns to Medicare are
much higher for disadvantaged groups, both in absolute terms and a fortiori as a percentage
of lifetime income. The key source of di®erence in our results is the ¯nding that Medicare
bene¯ts are signi¯cantly higher for less educated groups. Other research using aggregate
measures of SES ¯nd a °at or positive SES gradient in bene¯ts. Aggregate measures of
SES may understate the progressivity of Medicare by enough that it can dramatically a®ect
conclusions about redistribution. Using aggregate measures of SES, McClellan and Skinner
(1997) ¯nd that Medicare transferred dollars from the poor to the rich, but as we have shown,
the use of individual-level measures of SES leads to very di®erent conclusions. To be more
con¯dent about this claim, however, we must rule out some alternative sources of di®erences
between our results and those of previous researchers. The most obvious di®erence is in our
use of the MCBS, while other researchers have tended to use linked Medicare Administrative
Claims data. However, if the di®erence in data sets is not important, we ought to see that
the use of neighborhood income data in the MCBS itself also has the e®ect of °attening the
negative SES gradient.
Since the MCBS reports the county of residence for each respondent, we link the MCBS
to BEA data on per capita income (described in Appendix A) at the county level for each
year of the survey. We then split up the MCBS sample into county income quintiles, using
the MCBS sample weights. In essence, we are ranking each year's MCBS respondents by
county income, and then dividing up each yearly ranked sample into ¯ve quintiles of equal
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Figure 3 reports the results. The left-hand panels depict the bene¯t gradient across
county income quintiles, while the right-hand panels depict the gradient across education
groups. The data points in the right-hand panel correspond to the ¯gures reported in
Table 2. The gradient across county income quintiles is either °at or somewhat positive,
even though in the same data, the least educated individuals receive the most per capita
Medicare bene¯ts.
Aggregation seems to a®ect the size of the gradient, but not changes in the size of
the gradient, at least qualitatively. For instance, even across county income quintiles, the
gradient for females is more negative than for males. This pattern is replicated across
individual education groups as well. Nonetheless, there is a fairly consistent positive trend
22in bene¯ts across county income quintiles for males 75 and above, and for females over
85. Trends for men aged 65-74 and women aged 65-84 are °at, from the bottom to top
quintiles. On the basis of the county income quintile data, we might conclude that residents
of richer counties spend more or about the same amount of Medicare's resources, but the
individual-level data suggests that the most educated people use by far the least amount of
resources.
Aggregate measures of education seem to produce results similar to those of aggregate
income. Data from the 1990 Census data (described in Appendix A) allow us to compute
the fraction of people within each county who had at least a college degree (the average
proportion is about 20%) in 1989. Based on the fraction of College Graduates, we construct
county education quintiles.13 The results are shown in Figure 4.
The di®erence between Figures 3 and 4 is at the top quintiles. For the education measure,
there is a decline between the fourth and ¯ve quintiles that was not observed with the income
measure. The overall slope of the education curves, however, is either somewhat increasing
or °at, similar to the county income curves.
Previous research using aggregate measures of income (e.g., McClellan and Skinner, 1997)
used income measured at the level of the zip code, rather than the county. Using the MCBS
Zip Code data, we link the MCBS to measures of per capita income in each Zip Code from
the 1990 Census, which reports 1989 income.14 Figure 5 reports the results of computing
Medicare bene¯ts across Zip Code income quintiles.
The curves across Zip Code quintiles are °at or slightly increasing for men and women over
age 75, but they do decrease for people aged 65-74. In fact, they show signi¯cant negative
13One caveat to note is that we link the 1989 Census Data to the 1992-8 MCBS data and thus could be
measuring county education with error. This could °atten the slope of the resulting curves.
14The Census data are described in Appendix A.
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24gradients for this age group. However, the magnitudes are still not close to the magnitudes
for the individual-level data. From peak-to-trough, the zip income quintile declines by $1000
for females and $700 for males. In contrast, the gap between high school dropouts and college
graduates is $2000 for females and $1500 for males, about twice as large. Assuming we can
trust the measurement of zip code income data, it would appear that using this lower level
of aggregation does lessen the discrepancy with the individual-level measures, although only
partially.
At the county-level, aggregate measures of SES do not produce negative gradients,
whether SES is measured using education or income. At the zip code-level, it is possi-
ble to produce negative gradients using income data, but these are consistently (indeed, in
every case) half the size of the corresponding gradients using individual-level data. It seems
that aggregate measures of SES understate the bene¯ts of Medicare to the poor.
8 Conclusions
At any given age, the poor seem to receive more real Medicare bene¯ts than the rich, at least
when poverty is measured using individual-level educational attainment. These gradients are
signi¯cant enough that they almost exactly o®set the e®ects of early mortality for the poor.
As a result of these gradients, it appears that Medicare transfers considerably more resources
to the poor than previously thought. In addition, it also appears that measuring SES using
aggregated income measures may understate the true bene¯ts of Medicare to the poorest
groups.
Compared to previous work, our results are much stronger in favor of the conclusion that
Medicare bene¯ts the poor. They would only be strengthened if we also accounted for the
25observation of McClellan and Skinner (1997) that the nonpecuniary value of Medicare is
higher for the poor than for the rich. Not only is Medicare progressive in the sense that its
value represents a larger percentage of lifetime income for the poor, but the net present value
of Medicare is actually higher in absolute terms for high school dropouts than for college
graduates.
While we have investigated the ¯nancial returns to Medicare, further research is needed
to determine the true welfare consequences of Medicare, which include more than just the
pure dollar transfers. A dollar of Medicare bene¯ts may have di®erent values for people
in di®erent educational groups, primarily because the alternatives to Medicare may involve
very di®erent welfare levels for each educational group. For example, Medicare is much more
valuable to a group that would have had no insurance in its absence, and much less valuable
to a group that would have preferred to consume less insurance than Medicare mandates
were it given the choice.
26APPENDIX
A MCBS data
The MCBS contains detailed data on health expenditures and especially on Medicare expen-
ditures. MCBS respondents are linked to Medicare administrative data on claims.15 From
the claims data, the MCBS constructs total annual Medicare fee-for-service expenditure for
each respondent, as well as the total annual payment made to a Medicare HMO on behalf of
each respondent.16 The sum of the two represents Medicare's total outlay on each individual.
Medicare fee-for-service payments can be further broken down into Part A and B expen-
ditures, by using data on the type of service rendered. MCBS breaks expenditures down
into the following service categories: inpatient hospital visits, outpatient hospital visits, in-
stitutional utilization stays, facility stays, home health utilization, hospice stays, medical
provider visits, prescribed medicine, and dental visits. We take Part A expenditures to be
Medicare fee-for-service expenditures for: facility visits, home health utilization, hospice vis-
its, inpatient hospital visits, and institutional utilization. Part B expenditures are Medicare
fee-for-service expenditures for: dental visits, medical provider fees, and outpatient hospital
visits.
The geographic identi¯ers in the MCBS allow us to link it to several important databases
discussed in the text. The ¯rst is a data set containing the GPCI used to de°ate Medicare
physician payments across counties, and the hospital wage-price index used to de°ate hospital
payments across counties. These are used by Medicare to convert expenditures in each county
15For details of the linking procedure, see Eppig and Chulis (1997).
16About ten to ¯fteen percent of elderly Medicare bene¯ciaries are enrolled in Medicare HMOs. These
are private HMOs that contract with Medicare to provide medical care in exchange for a °at, per capita fee.
27to "relative value units" that are comparable across locales. They are available by county
and year. We de°ate Part A expenditures using the hospital wage-price index and de°ate
Part B expenditures and HMO capitation payments by the GPCI de°ators. The second data
set contains Bureau of Economic Analysis data on per capita personal income at the county
and state level, available by year. Of course, since the BEA classi¯es counties according to
the FIPS scheme, and the MCBS classi¯es them according to the SSA scheme, a crosswalk
is used. The last is data from the 1990 Census on 1989 per capita income and area-wide
educational attainment at the zip code, county, and state levels.17 The data contain the
number of residents in each zip code, county, and state with a certain educational attainment,
along with the total residents. They also contain per capita income data at each level of
geographic aggregation. Using these three databases, we are able to augment the MCBS data
so that it contains for each respondent: county-level price de°ators for all components of
Medicare; per capita personal income in state of residence for each year; per capita personal
income in county of residence for each year; per capita income in zip code of residence during
1990; and educational attainment in the state, county, and zip code of residence during 1990.
B Health and Retirement Study
The HRS is a longitudinal study of individuals born between 1931 and 1941, who have
survived until 1992. The ¯rst wave of the HRS was conducted in 1991. The ¯fth wave
collected data for 1999. It can be linked to quarterly Social Security Administration (SSA)
earnings records that go back to 1951. This linked ¯le contains earnings records for 9537
HRS respondents present in Wave 1. Between the linked ¯le and the HRS main ¯les, we
17These data are taken from GeoLytics (1996).
28have quarterly earnings histories from 1951 through 1999. The linked Social Security ¯le
contains data on Social Security covered earnings, or the amount of earnings subjected to
Social Security payroll taxes. However, from 1966 to 1992, the Medicare earnings maximum
was the same as the Social Security earnings maximum.
B.1 Interpolation Across Time in the HRS Main File
We use ¯ve waves of the HRS data. Waves 1 and 2 record income data from 1991 and
1993, respectively. Wave 3 records it in 1995 or 1996, depending on when the interview was
conducted. Wave 4 records it in 1997 or 1998, and Wave 5 records 1999 data. From these
data, we exponentially interpolate missing years, but only if we have data on years prior to
and following the missing year. In other words, we do not extrapolate any data.
B.2 Family Tax Liability
Since Medicare is ¯nanced by a payroll tax, the total expected tax liability ought to be
calculated at the level of the family. Men tend to work more and pay more taxes than
women, but these are taxes borne by the entire family, rather than just the individual
man. The HRS data simpli¯es the task of computing annual taxes paid by couples, since
a reasonable number of married couples in the HRS cohort are both present in the HRS
data and the linked Social Security earnings data. For these people, we have complete data
on the couple's income. The remaining respondents include the never married, widow(er)s,
divorce(e)s, and married people whose spouse is simply not present in the linked earnings ¯le.
For these people, we must impute spousal earnings, according to an algorithm we describe
below.
















































































































































































































12 22 23 57
Partnered 229 54 102 385
Separated 0 222 88 310
Divorced 0 807 270 1077























0 264 98 362
Unknown 0 68 762 830





















































Table 8 provides a useful description of the data. There are 13,478 respondents in Wave 1
of the HRS. 3941 of these are not present in the linked Earnings History ¯le. We drop these
observations. As long as selection into the Earnings History ¯le is random, this introduces
no bias.18 Another 6668 people (or 3334 couples) are present with their spouses or partners
in the Earnings History ¯le. For each of these people, we are able to calculate earnings
for the couple. Of the remaining 2869 people, 264 were never married; as such, individual
income is equal to family income, and we drop the 68 respondents for whom marital status
is unknown. This leaves 2537 people for whom family income must be imputed. Consider
¯rst the 1051 married or partnered respondents in this group. We impute spousal earnings
by looking at similar respondents and calculating the earnings of their spouses. Speci¯cally,
we compute the real average spousal earnings pro¯le of all similarly aged and educated
HRS respondents (of the same sex). The average earnings pro¯le is then assigned to each
respondent whose spouse is not present in the data. As discussed above, the 1029 divorced
or separated respondents are treated as if they were married; average spousal earnings are
18Haider and Solon (2000) show that, conditional on having a Social Security Number, selection into the
SSA ¯le is indeed random.
30imputed for them according to the same procedure. Even if the individual has been divorced
more than once, our strategy will not be a®ected, as long as his spouses have been similarly
educated.
This leaves only the 457 widowed respondents. The di±culty with these respondents is
estimating the year of their spouse's death, which is not reported in the data. The best
we can do is to make use of the HRS variable for "length of longest marriage." For those
who are currently married in wave one of the HRS, we compute the year they would have
been married, assuming that their current marriage is their longest marriage. This yields the
most recent year in which they could have been ¯rst married. We then compute the average
year within the four education groups we are considering, racial category (white, black, or
other), and age in 1991. This yields our estimate of year of marriage for widow(er)s. Using
the variable for length of longest marriage, we then compute the year in which each widow's
spouse would have died. This date is used to truncate the average real spousal earnings
pro¯le estimated above, and this ¯nally yields the earnings that the deceased spouse would
have contributed to the partnership. As a result of the data limitations we face, this is a
highly imperfect strategy, but it is important to stress that it a®ects less than 5% of our
sample. Even if we were to mismeasure income by 50% for these respondents, it would have
less than a 3% impact on our estimates of average income.
B.3 Self-Employment Income
The HRS SSA ¯le does not break apart taxable income into self-employment income and
wage income, even though Medicare taxed these two types of income at di®erent rates from
1966 to 1983. Today, the worker and ¯rm each pays half the tax on wage earnings. However,
31through 1983, self-employed people paid at the tax rate faced by the worker alone, which
amounts to half the total Medicare tax paid. Prior to this year, therefore, self-employed
individuals faced a lower total tax rate than workers. During the years with a Medicare
earnings cap, if a worker had earnings both from wage work and self-employment, her wage
taxes were calculated ¯rst, and then her self-employment tax. For example, suppose a worker
in 1967 had $6000 in wage income, and $4000 in self-employment income. Taxes would have
been collected on all her wage income, but only the ¯rst $600 of her self-employment income.
Her total tax would have been: (1.0%)*$6000+(0.5%)*$600=$63.
To decompose the HRS income measures into self-employment income and wage income,
we use data from the 1966-83 Current Population Surveys (CPS). The CPS asks respondents
about wage income, self-employment income, age, sex, educational attainment, and race.
From the CPS, we estimate-for every survey year, 5-year age group, education group, sex,
and race-the average proportion of total income subject to Medicare tax that was derived
from self-employment. We restrict these calculations to CPS respondents that reported some
income during the year. These proportions are then used to impute self-employment income
and wage income for the 1966-83 period. In practice, these imputations had very little e®ect
on our estimated rates of return from Medicare. Even ignoring this issue|and treating
all 1966-83 income as wage income|yields virtually the same rates of return. Nonetheless,
for the sake of consistency, we estimate self-employment income. Table 9 displays these
estimated proportions for the age ranges occupied by the HRS cohort in 1966 and 1982.
Self-employment income is relatively for women and young men throughout these age ranges.
It is, however, somewhat important for men over the age of 40, and particularly for high
school graduates.
















































HS Graduate Attendee Grad HS Graduate Attendee Grad
25-29 1.3% 2.6% 3.0% 2.1% 1.4% 1.8% 8.5% 2.1%
30-34 2.2% 4.8% 2.2% 2.9% 1.4% 1.9% 7.8% 0.8%
35-39 3.7% 7.0% 7.0% 6.6% 3.6% 3.9% 2.8% 2.1%
40-44 4.8% 6.0% 5.3% 8.8% 5.1% 4.6% 6.3% 2.1%
45-49 6.9% 12.6% 11.5% 9.1% 8.7% 4.3% 3.8% 9.9%
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